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Introduction
Following Axel Honneth and others, I accept that recognition is integral to individuals' self-realization and to social justice and that instances of misrecognition are injustices that cause moral injuries. The change in approach to misrecognition that I advocate is to replace a macrosocial top-down picture of misrecognition, such as Honneth's (2003; 2007a; 
Why a Multidimensional View?
Honneth provides us with the valuable insight that justice requires mutual recognition. Recognition is not sufficient for justice, but it is necessary for it. I cannot receive legal rights unless I am first recognized as a person. If I am not recognized as a member of the ethical community, I will not receive the respect that persons deserve. Recognition norms inform us what conduct is proper when we encounter certain types of people in certain types of situations. Engaging with recognition norms is part of our acceptance of our moral responsibility, and lack of a sense of moral responsibility for another is a significant factor in injustice. By Honneth's definition, recognition behavior is a tracking of specific positive properties in others as measured by means of social recognition norms (Honneth, 2008, 153) . For example, society's recognition norms teach me that I should respect honesty and that when I know someone who is honest in his dealings, I
recognize that individual as honest and treat him accordingly. Given Honneth's picture of misrecognition as the contrary of recognition (Honneth, 2003; Honneth 2007a) , it would seem that misrecognition behavior can be defined as occurrences in which recognition norms are not engaged and applied. If I meet someone who is honest, but I either do not care about honesty or do not recognize the other's honesty, I am not valuing the other appropriately. If I do not consider a right to be important or do not acknowledge an individual's entitlement to that right, I will not behave as required by that right toward the individual, and that is misrecognition.
Honneth's account gives the impression, intended or not, that if recognition norms are in place and engaged with, then there is justice in recognition relations.
For two reasons, I think the connection between recognition norms and misrecognition is not a binary one. First is that the norms themselves may be unjust, so following them would lead to injustice. Second is that engaging with the norms themselves is not always sufficient to achieve justice. We need to take these two aspects of recognition into account and extend Honneth's insights into the importance of recognition in justice by clearly indicating all that is required in recognition relations to achieve justice. A closer analysis of recognition norms and misrecognition behavior reveals their complex interrelationship. First, I will look at the ways that individuals do not engage with norms (a lack of vertical recognition), and then I will explore ways in which individuals can engage with norms that, in practice, perpetrate misrecognition on others. It is counterintuitive to think that misrecognition behavior could maintain engagement with recognition norms, but it is the case in some misrecognition behaviors.
Honneth does not develop this idea adequately, but he said that embedded within a discussion of individuals' socialization into their society's recognition order, "subjects acquire the capacity to move about within the normative structures of their social network by treating each other in accordance with the specific kind of recognitional relationship they maintain with each other (Honneth, 2011, p. 396) . I think this points to a core aspect of recognition-that it is behaviors within the constellation of relationships between individuals that must be constantly maintained by the individuals involved. I think that this thought opens up a new emphasis on recognition relations that I wish to expand.
Unlike Honneth, I do not think that "a just society requires no more than that subjects learn the various patterns of mutual recognition 'well enough'" (Honneth, 2011, p. 395) . I understand his point-that we need not place a moral burden on individuals to excel at the "art" of recognition. However, injustice occurs when recognition relations are dysfunctional, and recognition relations can be dysfunctional in ways beyond individuals not learning the patterns of mutual recognition-in other words, misrecognition is more than recognition norms not being applied.
To recognize another is to see him or her as a member of the ethical community and to acknowledge his or her experiences as real and worthy of consideration. Stephen Darwall (2010) has argued that the authority to demand respect from others and hold them answerable if they do not provide it are second-personal reasons that operate within a circle of mutually involving concepts of authority and accountability. Similarly, Christopher Zurn (2015) observes that only other recognizing agents can engage in the mutual interactions of recognition and participate in our claims of normative behavior expectations.
Mutual recognition and normative behavior require intersubjective involvement with other human beings as human beings. Because recognition is related to certain aspects of another individual, it is a specific response to a specific individual. Because recognition is by someone of someone, recognition is a relation between individuals. It is reasonable then to consider misrecognition as a dimension of social interaction in which recognition relations between individuals lack reciprocity. Recognition relations are complex, and we need to delve into what is involved in occurrences of misrecognition to craft a more expanded and finer-grained account than Honneth's account of misrecognition as the contrary of recognition. We need to clarify the relations of recognition norms to injustice and identify which norms contribute to injustice, and we also need to clarify the nature of our relations with individuals who are the recipients of our recognition. horizontal recognition: conditional, in which concern for the other individual is instrumentally calculated in terms of one's own interests, and unconditional, in which concern for the other individual is not conditioned by prudential considerations. Ikäheimo's reason for making these distinctions is to argue that only unconditional purely intersubjective horizontal recognition-recognition that is not of another individual as a bearer of a normative status but as an individual irreducible to functional significance-can be called "love" and "respect." When we are moved unconditionally by others, that is a genuine respect not mediated by a sense of obligation.
Ikäheimo's discussion makes clear the real-world benefits of mutual recognition and the harm that comes from misrecognition. Humans are autonomous beings, but one of the essential features of the human life-form distinguishing it from animal life-forms is that humans are governed by social norms authorized by humans themselves. This means, Ikäheimo says, that to live a human life, human individuals must recognize "vertically upwards" some norms as governing their lives, and it also means that they must recognize some others horizontally both in the normatively mediated sense as bearers of the rights, duties, entitlements, and responsibilities prescribed by the norms, and in the purely intersubjective sense as having or sharing authority on those norms (Ikäheimo, 2015, pp. 32-33) . Human freedom, then, is not a general independence from others (which is impossible) or freedom from being determined by anything other than oneself. Concrete freedom is finding oneself affirmed as having authority by other individuals who we affirm as having authority in the unconditional mode of respect and this is the goodness of mutual recognition. Genuine freedom is therefore a practical question of the real-life capacity and propensity for individuals to have genuine respect recognition for each other (Ikäheimo, 2015, pp. 35-36) .
How I interpret and apply Ikäheimo's conceptions is to understand that though we must vertically recognize that norms govern our social lives, there is more to applying a recognition norm than an awareness that applying it in one's interaction with another individual is the right thing to do. Recognition requires a set of norms and social institutions to guide it, but recognition also requires that Engagement is at the core of recognition because recognition always takes an individual as an object. Norms exert a constant influence on individuals, and the following of norms can be a nonreflective action. Recognition is different because it requires an intention-an unreflective following of the norms is not a recognition of another. Recognition norms are universal within a culture, but to be operative, the norms must be applied to an individual. Recognition norms are nonspecific and need to be made specific through an expression of intention. General recognition norms point to possible recognition behaviors, but this potential behavior must be made manifest through an individual expression directed at another individual. Because recognition is related to certain aspects of another individual, it is a specific response to the way a specific individual is.
Recognition is recognition only if it is the expression of a purposeful intention, not incidental or accidental, but directed and specific.
Recognition is a matter of caring about others in terms of significance, if not fondness. Human interaction that is without care for another's needs and wellbeing is itself a kind of misrecognition. The mutual nature of recognition calls for an intersubjective engagement between individuals of mutual valuing if not mutual affection. Because recognition is a relation of care, recognition comes more easily within personal relationships. According to Stanley Cavell (1976, pp. 238-266) , maintaining social relations requires engaging with another individual such that one is existentially involved in the emotional world of the other individual. The involvement Cavell describes need not be intimate but does need to be what he calls a "stance of acknowledgement" of the other individual that is emotional rather than cognitive. This involvement is a recognitional stance of mutual sympathy through which we come to understand that we have a moral responsibility to react to the other individual in specific ways.
I will explore ways in which recognition relations have gone wrong and lead to misrecognition. First I will discuss misrecognitions in which the problem is in vertical recognition, either disengagement from norms or engagement with problematic norms, and then I will discuss misrecognitions in which the problem is in horizontal recognition in which there is insufficient or improper engagement with other individuals.
Dimension of disengagement from norms
If an individual or social institution is not engaging with norms, then misrecognition is a likely consequence. If, for example, we ignore the recognition norm that says that productive labor should be rewarded, then we will not respect those who provide productive labor, which is a misrecognition. Individuals are socialized into social norms and learn their value, so broad general disregard for recognition norms would be rare. It is possible that someone can consciously and willfully disregard all norms, taking herself out of mutual recognition relations despite the cost of becoming a pariah in her community. However, given the essentialness of recognition for social functioning, it is far more likely that nonengagement with norms is a specific disregard within a specific situation. At times, we become oblivious to others in our everyday tasks and morally injure others in our inattention, but we can be prodded into awareness at any moment by seeing how we are not treating another appropriately. An example would be being so focused on one's current activity, such as driving or walking in a crowded area, that one forgets the rules regarding behavior, being either rude or otherwise negligent in our moral obligations to others. This type of misrecognition is prereflective and is often resolvable by reflecting on the effects of our obliviousness.
There can also be a more deliberate nonengagement with norms when individuals believe that certain norms are not appealing or convenient within a specific social environment. Disengagement from norms is compartmentalized to suit one's own interests without a rejection of moral responsibility in general.
Individuals can rationalize away their responsibility to follow specific norms in specific situations, such as in their workplace. Business owners, for example, can neglect the health and safety of their employees to preserve profits while at the same time being honest in their accounting practices. A supervisor could think that recognizing his employees' needs is unimportant because they are his subordinates but still treat friends and family justly. Workers, perhaps in response to their employers' actions, could believe that norms do not apply, or apply differently, in specific situations on the job. A worker could see dishonesty on the job as acceptable if it increases her productivity. Another could rationalize that his theft of company property is acceptable. Another could feel that she does not owe politeness or camaraderie to fellow workers because it is "just a job." By suspending the application of recognition norms in particular aspects of one's life, one is perpetrating misrecognition.
In the above examples of nonengagement, the norms themselves are not causing misrecognition and injustice. It is also possible that engagement with norms leads to misrecognition if the norms themselves are misrecognitions. In the next section, I identify two types of recognition norms that result in misrecognitions, differentiated by whether the norms are tracking putative negatives, which I call "normative discrimination," or putative positives, which I call "pathological recognition." I will discuss each in turn.
Normative discrimination
What I call "normative discrimination" is the use of recognition-like norms that designate particular social groups as having negative traits that characterize those groups as deficient and inferior, justifying negative consideration and treatment of those people. These norms are a form of negative recognition that mediates our interactions with certain groups, dictating that the appropriate response is to deny these groups positive recognition and moral consideration.
Because the discrimination is guided by recognition-like norms, individuals who perpetrate such discrimination believe they are behaving properly. The normative character of normative discrimination discourages questioning whether the traits it attributes to targeted groups are actually present in individual members of that group. The negative recognition of normative discrimination differs from a negative response to violations of norms such as disapproving of dishonesty or theft. There, the negative response recognizes the rights of those who have been wronged, and a negative response to wrongdoers is an appropriate upholding of norms. When we punish someone who has been convicted of a crime with imprisonment or fines, we are upholding general norms that recognize the rights of victims of the crime, even if we are denying recognition to the convicted individual's freedom and desire to not be punished.
In contrast, a normative discrimination is when a trait that should be neutral to moral norms (skin color, ethnicity, or religion) is taken as a negative and all who hold that trait are regarded as less worthy. Normative discrimination is directed predominantly at social groups separated by race, gender, class, and so on.
Additional illusionary negatives are often attributed to a social group, such as labeling all Muslims as violent, all Jews as dishonest, all gays as promiscuous, all who live in poverty as deserving their poverty because they are lazy, and so on.
How the targets of normative discrimination actually are is irrelevant to the negative stereotypes because the perpetrators follow the norms that dictate behavior toward the targeted groups. Veit Bader's (2007) "criteria of ascription," by which he categorizes structural asymmetries of power and practices of discrimination, oppression, and exclusion as being socially defined and ascribed characteristics of targeted groups, are examples of normative discrimination.
Normative discrimination can be taken to the extreme of a group being considered not deserving of any moral consideration. This misrecognition is beyond a lack of awareness of the moral standing of others and is a conscious antagonism toward others. An individual engaged in this comportment considers the appropriate response to other groups of human beings is to deprive the other actively of recognition as a human being. The extreme hostility toward a number of historically marginalized groups such as Gypsies and Jews in Europe, Dalits in India, and Burakumin in Japan are examples of this extreme normative discrimination. Someone born into one of these groups is condemned for life to misrecognition. The stigma attached to certain diseases or conditions also fits into normative discrimination. Those afflicted with leprosy were cast out from society as unclean. More recently, those afflicted with AIDS have suffered similar pariah status. In both cases, the ostracizing was accompanied by moral rebuke, the victims condemned as immoral simply for having a disease. One could say these people are rendered invisible, but it is more accurate to say they are condemned as unfit to be included and are dispossessed of rights and status.
The institution of slavery in the Americas is a historical example of how the recognition norms of normative discrimination structure human interactions.
Slavery is a relationship defined by a malicious use of power, but slavery in the Americas did not result from taking away an existing recognition relation from members of a community and enslaving them. Indentured servitude and debtors' prisons could be construed as a destruction of an existing recognition relation. An impoverished European (already suffering from normative discrimination because of his or her class) was condemned to a debtors' prison because he or she allegedly violated his or her responsibilities as a member of society. The social institution of debtors' prisons operated as a social relation that was used properly or improperly. An individual wrongly accused or condemned to debtors' prison would be suffering an injustice according to society's norms. Slavery operates under a very different set of assumptions because the normative discrimination based on race denied the possibility of recognition relations. Rather than a rupture of a recognition relation of social inclusion, the slave is, as Orlando Patterson (1982) observes, natally alienated. As Frantz Fanon (1967) observed, racism reduces others to a skin to which they are chained and determined. The recognition norms of the dominant culture are imposed onto the oppressed who are represented through normative discrimination as mere animal bodies unable to think, reason, or speak properly. The Native Americans and Africans enslaved by Europeans were always outsiders to the European slavers and had never been afforded recognition other than normative discrimination. The recognition order of European culture negatively recognized non-Europeans as inferior and uncivilized, and this normative assumption framed European encounters with indigenous people throughout the world. Africans and Native Americans had never been included, so enslaving them was ethically possible in a way that enslaving Europeans was not.
Because slaves were natally alienated by normative discrimination, questions about slaves' integrity, honor, autonomy, or self-respect were nonsensical to anyone who engaged with the norms that specified what the slaves were-property. Slaves were, as Patterson (1982, p. 263) observes, annulled of rights and identity, without ties to past or future, unrecognizable as human beings, at best shadow members of society. The attitude of impossibility of the slaves' social inclusion preceded the enslavement because the normative discrimination framed the recognition relations with the slave whether the slave was captured or born into slavery. Before the violent act of enslavement occurred, the target, reduced to skin as Fanon said, had been deemed to be compatible with enslavement. Whether the assessment was that the slaves were undeserving of freedom or deserving of enslavement, the misrecognition was a normative discrimination against those who possessed the trait of dark skin and, therefore, lacked humanity, dignity, and rationality. It is not so much that the slave was objectified as a tool as much as it was that the slave was tracked as being of no value beyond menial labor. Minorities of race, ethnicity, and religion are also negatively discriminated against and restricted to low-value occupations. Mostly, contributive injustice is tied to class, with labor divided between blue-collar and white-collar, and individual workers are subsumed under the norms that designate their social contributions and status.
Despite the fact that contributive injustice damages society, causing it to miss out on the potential contributions of so many, its injustice persists because the normative discrimination is seen as a proper response to how things are. Sayer (2009, p. 87) observes that one of the most common contemporary misrecognitions is underestimating the extent to which structural inequalities give only some individuals preferential access to practices that are socially recognized. Sayer argues that the cause of this unequal distribution of occupations-society's structural inequalities-is likely to be misrecognized as being the deserved product of effort and intelligence. Furthermore, specific individuals' contributions are evaluated according to the unequal distribution of labor, misrecognizing their contributions and qualities. The combination of these two misrecognitions means that regardless of individual traits and efforts, the economically privileged are seen as having earned their wealth through hard work and superior ability, and the economically disadvantaged are seen as deserving of their lack of wealth because they are lazy and incompetent. These misrecognitions hide and reinforce contemporary society's structures that created class inequality, contributive and distributional injustices, and their accompanying normative discrimination norms.
In normative discrimination, a negative preconception, not the other individual, is being seen. The other is being viewed through the negative preconception and treated with hostility on the basis of it. The mistake in normative discrimination is that the perpetrator is guided by his or her own preconceptions (though these preconceptions are usually learned from the Stanley Cohen (1972) observed that the behavior of subcultures, such as the violence between mods and rockers in the United Kingdom in the 1960s, is exaggerated by the mainstream culture to hysterical proportions, generating unwarranted hostility against those subcultures. Members of the subculture are stigmatized as moral outsiders or, as Cohen calls them, "folk devils," who are defined as a threat to the mainstream social order, values, and interests. The perceived threat becomes a moral panic, rousing normative discrimination against the members of the subculture. Members of a subculture are labeled as deviants, and "once a person is thus type cast, his acts are interpreted in terms of the status to which he has been assigned" (Cohen, 1972, p. 12) .
The morality of normative discrimination is easily compartmentalized by perpetrators. Those who deny equal rights to women, minorities, immigrants, or other groups often do not see themselves as being against rights and equality. 
Pathological recognition
Recognition norms that purport to recognize groups of individuals positively but in practice misrecognize them I label "pathological recognition"-recognition norms that cause injustice. In pathological recognition, social relations are structured by a recognition order that designates social groups, such Individuals are recognized for adhering to their responsibilities and duties to society, and their recognized compliance gives them a social identity. These theorists tend to reject recognition as irredeemable. Althusser rejects recognition as the central mechanism of ideology, and McNay rejects recognition as a model for emancipatory critique. Markell sees the pursuit of recognition of our identity from social institutions as unobtainable, contributing to injustice rather than emancipating us from it. What these negative conceptions of recognition tend to overlook is that the forces of domination succeed because they are exploiting a positive social mechanism. Recognition can be distorted and used to dominate people because recognition can have a positive influence on individuals but can be difficult for individuals to discern. As Honneth (2007b) says, we need to distinguish the false forms of recognition from its correct morally positive forms, even though identifying "correct and morally required" recognition is even more difficult than Honneth assumes.
What I argue separates false forms of recognition from positive ones is that the former attribute to individuals stereotypical traits and value judgments that subsume individuals under a group definition. These attributed recognition norms hinder those individuals' possibilities for self-realization and receiving recognition for their actual qualities and contributions. Because pathological recognition norms appear to be positive recognition but in practice perpetrate misrecognition, they are false dis-ease-causing forms of recognition. Pathological recognition's positive affirmations are deceptions that mislead individuals into accepting affirmations that limit them. Honneth gives the example of the idea of the heroic soldier, which grants to men who suffer social insignificance and a lack of prospects a type of recognition by becoming part of the military subculture (Honneth, 2007b) . This example illustrates how pathological recognition works.
In the military subculture, individuals gain a measure of prestige and honor while at the same time being treated as nonautonomous servants of the state, if not used as canon fodder to achieve aims in which they have little or no involvement or from which they do not benefit. It is, at its core, a pathological recognition that lionizes war and honors "Our Glorious Dead" while downplaying the reality that they are, indeed, now dead. We should not doubt that many served honorably, and whether they acted for their country, families, or comrades in arms, they did their jobs properly and are worthy of our esteem. We also should not doubt that the esteem many individuals give to military veterans is sincere and with cause.
Many of those who adopt the pathological recognition norms are not deliberately misrecognizing others but are following social norms, so they believe they are behaving properly. Individual soldiers accepted the pathological recognition that glorifies war because it offers them with a place to belong and a sense of purpose, even if it denied them other options for self-relation and social affirmation.
Maybe they had no better options, because of their social position and society's contributive injustice, to achieve social status. This is why pathological recognition cannot be reduced to ideological machinations of the power structure. We need to discern how pathological recognition relations become part of the social fabric of normative expectations. 
Dimension of Horizontal Engagement with Individuals
So far, we have discussed vertical misrecognition behaviors that are shaped by engagements with problematic norms and seen briefly how they discourage engagements with individuals. Now, we move to horizontal misrecognition behaviors that more directly stem from a disengagement from other individuals.
The moral aspect of human interaction is that recognition is possible only at a level of engagement in which other individuals are seen as having a moral value.
Intersubjective engagement means interaction with and awareness of other individuals as individual human beings with thoughts and desires who deserve moral consideration. Recognition relations need both engagement with norms and engagement with individuals to affirm individual self-realization and freedom.
Depending on how powerful the processes are that diminish a sense of moral responsibility, horizontal misrecognition could be structurally entrenched in interpersonal interactions or could be a by-product of a temporal forgetfulness from which an individual can recover. If it is the former, misrecognition behavior is entrenched and difficult for an individual to perceive, much less overcome. If it is the latter, then perhaps moral responsibility to others is only forgotten or obscured but not entirely abandoned. Not engaging with others intersubjectively precludes the possibility of adequately recognizing others, resulting in misrecognition such that we are oblivious and inconsiderate. These are behaviors in which we are no longer responsive to the other and we no longer recognize the other for who he or she is and how he or she is behaving. Within this type of misrecognition, the perpetrator would not see the other individual, resulting in blindness to the positive contributions and capacities of others, forestalling recognition. However, this is not to say that the individual who is not engaging intersubjectively is deliberately engaging in misrecognition behavior or is even aware of misrecognizing others. A perpetrator could be so engrossed in his or her activities, even while conducting them in a moral way, that he or she loses awareness of dealing with another human being. We go about our activities aware that others are present but not recognizing them as individuals, and this misrecognition is part of the self-absorption of everyday life. Honneth gives the example of a tennis player who is so focused on winning that she forgets her opponent is her best friend. Her goal has become independent of the context in which it originated, and "any attentiveness for the cooperating partner vanishes completely" (Honneth, 2008, p. 155) . The tennis player has not forgotten the rules of the game but has forgotten her opponent's humanness and is no longer engaging intersubjectively with her friend. Winning the match has become a single purpose independent of her other relations to the world. Such a forgetfulness of others is commonplace in everyday life when we are caught up in everyday tasks and fail to notice and appreciate others as individuals like ourselves. In such forgetful behavior, we do not see other individuals as agents whose contributions and personal well-being should be taken into account. We perhaps remain polite, giving the appropriate gestures of civil behavior, but because we are forgetting the other, our courtesy is cursory and cold. This unintentional disengagement from others is temporary and does not necessarily lead to the elimination of all intersubjective engagements.
This dimension of misrecognition could be a deliberate withdrawal from intersubjective engagements or an involuntary loss of the capacity for intersubjective engagements. Deliberate withdrawal from intersubjective relations is not a forgetting but a denial or defensiveness resulting in not considering the possibility of others' contributions and personal well-being. A deliberate withdrawal is most likely isolated within certain social interactions rather than across an individual's entire life-for example, an individual being inconsiderate of others while posting comments online-engaging in thoughtless or aggressive behaviors he or she would not engage in within other interpersonal interactions. Disengagement may also result from general insecurity and anxiety.
We are, as Cillian McBride (2013, pp. 136-137) says, recognition-sensitive beings because our well-being depends on receiving recognition, as Honneth says. We need recognition from others, and the potential lack of it is a threat. It is no surprise that social life comes with anxiety about how others will judge us and our actions. Such anxiety limits how much we are willing to risk exposure to negative judgments from others, and we deliberately hold back from engaging with others.
Tension in recognition relations explains a great deal of the social anxiety we all have, and it explains why some individuals protect a positive self-image by telling themselves they do not need others' approval, which is another way intersubjective engagement can be cut off. Within our relationships, changes in circumstances or in other individuals change our recognition relations with them.
We are creatures of habit, and we tend to resist change. The threat of changes in relations leads to the temptation to withdraw from intersubjective engagement.
In objectification, one engages with specific other individuals but nonetheless takes them to be the same as others who seem to possess similar traits and capacities. This generalization neglects the distinct traits and needs of the individual, objectifying or commoditizing him or her. In more benign forms, objectification is a general depersonalization, akin to the temporary lack of intersubjective engagement, in which only a general recognition of that individual is possible. Because we are not engaging with that person as a specific individual,
we are less open to recognition relations beyond acknowledging him or her as a human being. The other individual is perceived as only a member of a type and is objectified or commoditized. Objectification is often malevolent. Normative discrimination against groups leads to objectification of individuals whose particular traits and capacities are erased by an identity attributed to them that opens up the objectified to abuse. Within patriarchy, women are objectified as beings in service of male desires. Sexual objectification of women has multiple forms and degrees, but the common denominator is that women are the proper objects of male sexual desire, the proper purpose of women being that they are used in order to satisfy that desire. As Timo Jütten (2016) has argued, sexual objectification of women is more than instrumentalisation of them; it is a social meaning imposed on them that undermines their autonomy and equal social standing even at times when they are not being used as an instrument to gratify male desire.
To objectify another individual is to see that person as not worth engaging with intersubjectively. We know that we have more latitude in how we treat objects than in how we treat other human beings, and we can use objects as we see fit. When individuals are objectified, they are objects for our use. In sexual objectification, the woman is excluded from intersubjective engagement because her normative status is as a sexual object, and not even a particular sexual object, but a fungible one. She is a commodity to be bought, sold, and used. This, I argue, is because objectification, unlike normative discrimination, sees the victim as having use value but not as an individual. The companion to pathological recognition's putative positives of women's gender roles is that women are portrayed as subordinate objects whose value is lessened by intersubjective engagement, plus, intersubjective engagement reveals the woman is not an object. This normative status of women as sexual objects not to be engaged with as individuals enables human trafficking and sexual slavery. Attempts by women to exercise their autonomy in opposition to their imposed social meaning are met with stern and perhaps violent attempts to reassert their objectification.
Self-absorbed disengagement involves behaviors in which the disengagement is driven not by norms but either by a refusal to acknowledge or deal with another or by a moral judgment that the other individual is not worth engaging with as an equal. Perhaps the other is considered to have no qualities of value to the community or not having wants or needs worth considering. What interaction there is with others assumes how other individuals are, and one is resistant to contrary information. Self-absorbed disengagement is misrecognition in its denial of the other individual's value. Various kinds of social ostracizing, shunning, and disregard are examples of self-absorbed disengagement.
Instances of this misrecognition behavior involve restricting the granting of recognition to a select few, while disregarding or denying recognition to others. A line is drawn between those who are "us" and those who are "them," and we engage with "us" but not with "them." Honneth (2007a, p. 227) gives the example of a robber recognizing his companions while misrecognizing his victim. Similar divisions are drawn by almost all individuals who, wittingly or not, engage more with individuals within their group but less with those outside their group. This explains the tendency that all individuals have of according more recognition to those within their social circle than to those outside it. We each have our own lives and our own involvements and relationships, and it is no surprise that we tend to place more importance on individuals and relationships close to us. The human tendency to view those outside our own group through a lens of our own preconceptions is a common form of misrecognition. This disengagement happens at all levels of society, from ignoring other individuals who are not our friends or family, to governments not seeing members of groups for who they are.
Unlike normative discrimination and pathological recognition, this type of misrecognition is not driven by social norms as much as by individuals' decisions of inclusion and exclusion. It does not have the entrenched hostility and dehumanization of normative discrimination, but there is a lack of genuine respect and consideration of those outside one's social circle. McBride quotes Patricia Williams on the attitudes of white tourists to local African-American churches, saying that for the whites, "no one existed for them who could not be governed by their intensions" (as cited in McBride, 2013, p. 37) .
In other words, for the white tourists, African-Americans did not exist as individuals, only as objects to be used for their pleasure. These condescending and patronizing attitudes are not seen by perpetrators as disrespectful, and it might not even occur to them that they are misrecognitions. We could count some of this as the manifestation of privilege, but in a broader sense it reveals a common human laziness to engage with others and be open to perceiving them as they are.
So far, I have discussed the dimension of personal engagement only in its positive aspect-that because acknowledging another individual's positive traits is recognition, the absence of this acknowledgment is misrecognition. There is also personal engagement that is perverse. Intersubjective engagement is perverse when it is perpetrated with intentions contrary to affirming the other positively. In perverse engagement, in regard to the individual engaged with, recognition norms are willfully neglected because the needs and desires of the other are subsumed under the perpetrator's desires. Unlike normative discrimination that targets a social group, in perverse engagement the perpetrator targets a specific individual, believing either that this specific individual does not deserve to be treated well or that this individual's deservedness is unimportant in the context of the perpetrator's larger concerns.
Perverse engagement ranges from selfishness to active manipulation of another to sadistic behavior. Examples of perverse engagement would be a bully who targets a specific individual to abuse or a boss who harasses a particular employee. Most bullying and harassment are targeted antagonism that can be understood as perverse engagement. Another example is a con artist engaging with an individual to swindle him or her. The con artist may have selected a target on the basis of the target's perceived vulnerability or gullibility, and the con artist ignores the norms against theft and dishonesty, specifically in terms of that individual, even if the con artist is honest with others. The con artist is engaging with the other, recognizing and acting in response to the individual's qualities, only in the service of his or her involvement in the successful swindle, but there is not necessarily a specific antagonism toward the target.
The complexity of the negative aspect of personal engagement can be unpacked further. The misrecognition behavior of perverse individual engagement is characterized by the self-absorbed perpetrator focusing on a personal relation but not on recognition or moral norms. In other words, the character of perverse individual engagement is not "these norms are irrelevant" but "for this specific individual these norms are irrelevant." A stalker is obsessed with a specific individual to the extent that norms of appropriate conduct are subsumed under the stalker's desires, which disregards how the other individual actually is. Stalkers often falsely believe the objects of their obsession return their interest and do not take in information to the contrary. If the stalker was engaging intersubjectively with the other individual, he or she would take into account the expressions of noninterest from the other person. But because the stalker is engaging not with the other but with his or her own attributed identity of the other, there is no intersubjective engagement. An individual seeking revenge on another is engaged with that individual but seeks to harm him or her, so the engagement is not an intersubjective genuine respect. The perpetrator considers that the other deserves to be harmed, not affirmed.
Conclusion
The multidimensional view of misrecognition expands the tools available to us to investigate and understand injustice. The misrecognitions perpetrated by and experienced by individuals do not map onto Honneth's typology of misrecognition as being the contrary of recognition-a typology that is too narrowly construed to encompass the diversity of misrecognition behaviors. analysis adds complexity to our task of understanding misrecognition, because it calls for a deeper analysis of individual relations, attitudes, and actions, but such an analysis will give our social theory greater explanatory power.
